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The United States Arms Embargo Against




With reports of violence and unrest in the Republic of South Africa a
daily feature in American newspapers, public attention in the United
States has increasingly focused on a variety of American efforts to bring
an end to apartheid.. Little discussed in the ongoing debate over imposi-
tion of new measures is the sanction that the United States has main-
tained for the past twenty-three years: the South African arms embargo.
How effective has this sanction been in denying South Africa access to
items with military utility? Are there ways to strengthen the arms em-
bargo so that it achieves greater success?
An evaluation of the embargo is complicated by the fact that there is
no one place in which the laws implementing it can be found. Rather,
the relevant regulations have been incorporated into the existing, com-
plex scheme of U.S. trade law. This article offers a complete account of
the laws and regulations implementing the embargo, analyzes the defects
in the regulatory scheme, and recommends ways to strengthen the em-
bargo. The first part outlines the background of the imposition of the
embargo, while the next three parts examine the regulations that govern
American exports to South Africa and explore the loopholes in these reg-
ulations that hinder their effectiveness. Part II discusses items on the
t J.D. Candidate, Yale University.
1. Congress recently imposed various sanctions on South Africa. See Comprehensive
Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-440, 100 Stat. 1086 (1986). The legislation was
vetoed by President Reagan, but took effect after the House and Senate overrode the veto.
N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1986, at Al, col. 4. Major features of the law include a ban on American
imports of South African steel, iron, uranium, coal, textiles, and agricultural products, a prohi-
bition on new corporate investment in South Africa and new loans to South African govern-
ment agencies, a prohibition on U.S. banks' acceptance of deposits from South African
government agencies, and a revocation of landing rights in the United States for South African
Airways. N.Y. Times, Aug. 16, 1986, at 4, col. 1.
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United States Munitions List, exports of which are controlled by the
State Department. Part III deals with non-Munitions List items, exports
of which are controlled by the Commerce Department. Part IV exam-
ines the export of nuclear equipment and materials, an activity regulated
chiefly by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Finally, Part V recom-
mends ways in which the arms embargo can be strengthened to bar more
effectively the South African regime from access to American arms and
related materials.
I. Background
On November 4, 1977, the United States joined in the unanimous vote
of the United Nations Security Council adopting Security Council Reso-
lution 418,2 which established a mandatory arms embargo against the
Republic of South Africa. This resolution succeeded Security Council
Resolution 181,3 a non-binding call to all nations to adhere voluntarily to
an arms embargo, which had been in effect from 1963 to 1977.
Security Council Resolution 418 declares that the acquisition of arms
by South Africa "constitutes a threat to the maintenance of international
peace and security" and directs all states to
cease forthwith any provision to South Africa of arms and related rnatdriel
of all types, including the sale or transfer of weapons and ammunition, mili-
tary vehicles and equipment, paramilitary police equipment, and spare
parts for the aforementioned, and... cease as well the provision of all types
of equipment and supplies and grants of licensing arrangements for the
manufacture or maintenance of the aforementioned.
Furthermore, all states are directed to "refrain from any cooperation
with South Africa in the manufacture and development of nuclear
weapons."
'4
The United States has incorporated adherence to the United Nations
arms embargo into its existing trade regulatory scheme. Thus, responsi-
bility for supervising compliance with the embargo is divided among var-
ious executive departments. Broadly speaking, the State Department
controls exports of defense articles and defense services, the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission oversees exports of nuclear equipment and
materials, and the Commerce Department administers regulations gov-
erning exports of other commodities and technical data.
2. S.C. Res. 418, 32 U.N. SCOR Res. & Decs. at 5, U.N. Doe. S/INF/33 (1977).
3. S.C. Res. 181, 18 U.N. SCOR Res. & Decs. at 7, U.N. Doe. S/INF/18/Rev. 1 (1963).
4. S.C. Res. 418, supra note 2. The Security Council stated that in adopting the resolution
it was acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.
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II. Exports Under State Department Control
A. The United States Munitions List
The Arms Export Control Act 5 gives the President statutory authority
to control the import and export of all defense articles and defense serv-
ices. The Act provides that items so designated shall be placed on the
United States Munitions List.6 The export of Munitions List items is reg-
ulated exclusively by the Department of State.7 The regulations are
known as the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR)8 and are
administered by the Office of Munitions Control (OMC). 9 Anyone who
manufactures or exports "defense articles" 10 or furnishes "defense serv-
ices" 11 must register with the OMC.'
2
Unless certain exemptions apply, 13 an OMC license is required for the
export of defense articles14 or related technical data.15 Likewise, reex-
port of Munitions List items requires prior written approval from the
State Department.' 6 American companies must also obtain the approval
of the OMC before furnishing defense services abroad.'
7
The ITAR state that it is U.S. policy "to deny licenses and other ap-
provals with respect to defense articles and defense services destined for
or originating in certain countries or areas.... This policy also applies
to countries or areas with respect to which the United States maintains
an arms embargo."18 Furthermore, no significant exemptions from li-
censing19 apply to exports to proscribed countries.20
5. 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (1982).
6. Id. The Munitions List is printed at 22 C.F.R § 121.1 (1985). The authority to issue
export regulations with respect to Munitions List items was delegated by the President to the
Secretary of State. Exec. Order No. 11,958, 3 C.F.R. 79, 80-81 (1978).
7. 22 C.F.R. § 120.4 (1986).
8. 22 C.F.R. pts. 120-30 (1986).
9. 22 C.F.R. § 120.1 (1986). The OMC is an office within the Bureau of Politico-Military
Affairs of the U.S. Department of State.
10. "Defense article" is defined as any item on the Munitions List. See id. § 120.7.
11. For the definition of "defense services," see infra note 41.
12. 22 C.F.R. § 122.1(a) (1986).
13. Exempt items include obsolete firearms, firearms for personal use, minor components,
Canadian and Mexican border shipments, and nuclear materials under the export control of
the Department of Energy or the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. See id. §§ 123.16-21.
14. 22 C.F.R. § 123.1(a) (1986).
15. Id. § 125.2(a).
16. Id. §§ 123.9(a), 124.9(e), 125.1(c). The State Department can also deny or revoke
licenses and approvals without prior notice whenever it "deems such action to be in further-
ance of world peace, the national security, or the foreign policy of the United States." Id.
§ 126.7.
17. Id. § 124.1(a).
18. Id. § 126.1(a).
19. The only exception, 22 C.F.R. § 123.17 (1986), refers to personal firearms and ammu-
nition belonging to U.S. persons traveling abroad.
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B. Exports of Munitions List Items to South Africa
.In October 1986, Congress codified the South African arms embargo
by passing the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act, prohibiting the ex-
port to South Africa of items on the Munitions List.21 The only excep-
tion to the Act is that the President can authorize the export of specific
items not covered by Security Council Resolution 418 if he determines
that such items are to be exported solely for commercial purposes. Prior
to such authorization, the President must notify Congress and allow it
thirty days to disapprove the sale by joint resolution. 22
It is difficult to predict what the effects of the new law will be. Under
current OMC regulations, the intended use of a defense article or service
after its export is not supposed to be relevant to whether the export is
subject to Munitions List controls.23 The Director of the OMC is au-
thorized to waive the denial policy pertaining to exports to arms-embar-
goed countries only in "a case of exceptional or undue hardship, or when
it is otherwise in the interest of the United States Government. ' 24
In fact, the State Department has ignored its own regulations. OMC
disclosures reveal that its officials authorized twenty-nine separate ex-
ports of Munitions List items to South Africa during fiscal years 1981-83,
covering goods worth over $28.3 million. 25 According to OMC Director
William Robinson, commodities with "inherent commercial applica-
tions" were approved, including data encryption equipment, navigation
gear, image intensifiers, and technical know-how. 26 Robinson acknowl-
edged that the recipients of these exports included "two government-run
installations, the National Physical Research Laboratory and the Na-
tional Institute for Aeronautics and Systems Technology, both of which
do classified military research." 27 Under the new law, exports such as
20. Id. § 126.1.
21. Pub. L. No. 99-440, § 317, 100 Stat. 1086, 1104-15 (1986).
22. Id. §§ 317-318.
23. 22 C.F.R. § 120.3. This section is entitled "Policy on designating defense articles and
services," and discusses the criteria used to determine the composition of the Munitions List.
The primary criterion is whether an item "is deemed to be inherently military in character."
Id. With the narrow exception of certain spare parts and components, that "an article or
service may be used for both military and civilian purposes does not in and of itself determine"
whether it will be placed on the Munitions List, and "[t]he intended use of the article or service
after its export (i.e., for a military or civilian purpose) is also not relevant in determining
whether the export is subject to the controls of this subchapter." Id.
24. Id. § 126.3.
25. American Friends Service Committee/NARMIC, Military Exports to South Africa-
A Research Report on the Arms Embargo 3 (Jan. 1984) [hereinafter Military Exports].
26. Id.
27. Id. at 4.
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these are likely to continue under the President's authority to allow ex-
ports for commercial purposes.
These waivers in the area of military electronics take on added signifi-
cance when one considers that image intensifiers, for example, are used in
military night vision equipment crucial gear for military and police
units waging guerrilla warfare at night or in bad weather.28 Without im-
porting such vital components, the South African company that manu-
factures night vision equipment 29 could not make a single pair of night-
vision binoculars.30 Indeed, one author calls military electronics "the
most sensitive spot in South Africa's arms procurement" because the
"immense range of components required by modem industry, especially
in the military field, the high level of technology and the rapid develop-
ment of components technology make it impossible for South Africa to
become self-supplying in this field."'3
1
In addition to these licensed breaches of the arms embargo, there have
been illegal arms sales to South Africa-that is, arms have been exported
with no license at all. A few of these sales have been detected by the U.S.
government, which has responded by prosecuting the violators. In 1978,
for example, Olin Corporation was convicted and fined for falsification
by its Winchester Division of export applications for shipment of fire-
arms and ammunition. 32 In 1980-81, Space Research Corporation of
Vermont was prosecuted and two of its top officers were imprisoned for
selling arms, ammunition, technology, and technical assistance to South
Africa, leading to that nation's "acquisition and development 'of ad-
28. S. Faltas, Philips: Electronics and the Arms Trade*212 (1981) (unpublished paper for
Peace Research Group, Free University, Amsterdam) (copy on file with the Yale Journal of
International Law). The author adds that until 1979, the United States refused to provide
related manufacturing technology even to fellow NATO nations. Id.
29. The company is one of the many subsidiaries of Armaments Development and Produc-
tion Corporation (ARMSCOR), South Africa's "state-owned arms conglomerate." Military
Exports, supra note 25, at 4.
30. S. Faltas, supra note 28, at 212.
31. Id. at 211; see also Klare, Evading the Embargo: Illicit U.S. Arms Transfers to South
Africa, 35 J. INT'L AFF. 15, 21 (1981). Klare asserts that South Africa must rely on imports of
electronics and other high-technology gear to streamline its military operations, an important
goal because of the small size of the pool from which the country draws its key military
personnel.
32. See B. BRANAMAN, SOUTH AFRICA: ISSUES FOR U.S. POLICY 8 (Congressional Re-
search Service Issue Brief IB80032, Nov. 19, 1985) (available from the Foreign Affairs and
National Defense Division of the Congressional Research Service); see also Klare, supra note
31, at 22 (quoting allegations, arising from the court proceedings against Olin and from an
earlier prosecution against an employee of Colt Industries for similar violations, that the State
Department regularly "acquiesced" in illegal "sales by 'looking the other way' when presented
with fraudulent export declarations").
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vanced 155 mm. artillery systems which have made major contributions
to its regional military capabilities. '33
The United States government is generally lax in enforcing the arms
embargo, and it is often only by chance that reporters discover viola-
tions. 34 It thus seems unlikely that the few violations which have been
detected and prosecuted are the only illegal arms sales that have taken
place.
C. Exports of Military Information and Technology
The ITAR also cover licensing and technical agreements. These regu-
lations involve the export of technical data or defense articles, the per-
formance of defense services, and the use by a foreign party of technical
data or defense articles previously exported by a U.S. party.35 Such
agreements must be approved by the OMC 36 and are therefore subject to
the general policy of denial of licenses and other approvals with respect
to defense services destined for arms embargoed countries. 37
It should be noted that, with respect to foreign companies producing
products under license from American corporations, officials charged
with enforcing U.S. export laws face "particularly acute" problems. 38
According to one article, "[i]t has been alleged that a number of such
illegal third country reexports of items on the Munitions List have taken
place."
39
Another effect of the ITAR is to restrict scientific and technological
cooperation between the United States and South Africa with respect to
Munitions List items. This cooperation is regulated by the inclusion on
the Munitions List of "technical data"'' and "defense services" 41 related
33. Enforcement of the United States Arms Embargo Against South Africa: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Africa of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs (appendix), 97th Cong., 2d
Sess. 41 (1982) [hereinafter Hearing] (staff study of the Subcommittee on Africa of the House
Committee on Foreign Affairs on The Space Research Case and the Breakdown of the U.S.
Arms Embargo Against South Africa); see also Klare, supra note 31, at 22-24.
34. Klare, supra note 31, at 25.
35. 22 C.F.R. § 120.14 (1986).
36. Id. § 124.1.
37. Id. § 126.1(a).
38. Mehlman, Milch & Toumanoff, United States Restrictions on Exports to South Africa,
73 Am. J. INT'L L. 581, 594 (1979).
39. Id. (footnote omitted). One example cited is the reported shipment by the Italian firm
Oto Melara of U.S.-designed armored personnel carriers and self-propelled guns to South
Africa.
40. "Technical data" includes information
directly related to the design, engineering, development, production, processing, manufac-
ture, use, operation, overhaul, repair, maintenance, modification, or reconstruction of
defense articles.... This also includes information which advances the state of the art of
Arms Embargo Against South Africa
to defense articles listed in the other categories of the list,42 and is subject
to the same embargo policy as the listed defense articles.
Although the ITAR explicitly deal with exports of scientific and tech-
nical arms-related information, they do not restrict the export of infor-
mation about American military and law enforcement techniques.
However, Congress, in the general statute authorizing American training
of foreign military and related civilian personnel, has declared that such
education and training activities should be designed in part "to increase
the awareness of nationals of foreign countries participating in such ac-
tivities of basic issues involving internationally recognized human
rights."'43 Accordingly, a U.S. representative at the United Nations has
asserted that the United States "does not provide military training to the
South African armed forces or police." 44
Despite the claim that the U. S. government does not assist in the mili-
tary training of South Africans, various contacts between American offi-
cials and South African military and police personnel have taken place.
In 1983, for example, the federal government trained a South African
vice and drug officer in "drug law enforcement techniques, '45 and be-
tween 1981 and 1984, the Coast Guard trained ten South African naval
and air force officers in search and rescue techniques acknowledged by
the State Department to be of potential military benefit.46 At the local
level, a South African police major participated in a police-media train-
ing program in Chicago in 1982, 47 and in 1983, two South Africans at-
tended a Detroit convention of the International Association of Chiefs of
Police, an organization which includes South African police and securify
officials among its members.48 Referring to South Africa's 1982 admis-
sion to a similar body, Police General Mike Geldenhuys said that
articles on the U.S. Munitions List. This does not include information concerning general
scientific, mathematical or engineering principles.
22 C.F.R. § 120.21 (1986).
41. "Defense services" means the furnishing to foreign persons, whether in the United
States or abroad, of technical data or of assistance, including training, "in the design, engineer-
ing, development, production, processing, manufacture, use, operation, overhaul, repair,
maintenance, modification, or reconstruction of defense articles." Id. § 120.8.
42. Id. § 121.1.
43. 22 U.S.C. § 2347(b) (1982).
44. Statement by Jeffrey A. Bader, United States Representative to the Fourth Committee,
Press Release USUN 94-(84) from the United States Mission to the United Nations (October
23, 1984).
45. Military Exports, supra note 25, at 6 (quoting interview with Drug Enforcement Ad-
ministration, National Action/Research on the Military Industrial Complex, Nov. 7, 1983).
46. Id.; Strategic Sales to South Africa Reach New High, AFR. Nnws, Oct. 22, 1984, at 6
[hereinafter Strategic Sales].
47. Military Exports, supra note 25, at 6.
48. Id. at 7.
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"[b]ecoming a member of [the International Police Association] is a
highlight in these times of isolation experienced by South Africa."'49
Thus, in addition to increasing South African police capabilities, contacts
of this type "give the security forces a mantle of respectability and boost
their morale."50
Even more ominous are revelations that South Africa has access to
important NATO classified information. In 1983, the FBI detained a
South African naval officer, Dieter Gerhart, and returned him to South
Africa, where he was convicted of treason for spying for the Soviets.5 A
Washington Post reporter wrote that Gerhart had access to "most of
NATO's electronic intelligence" and to "secrets of NATO military and
computer codes."
'52
It is possible that contacts with the South African armed forces will
cease to occur as a result of Congress's recent decision to bar all agencies
and entities of the United States from engaging in any form of coopera-
tion with the South African armed forces.53 However, because Congress
excepted "activities which are reasonably designed to facilitate the collec-
tion of necessary intelligence,"' 54 activities such as the sharing of NATO
information with South Africa are likely to continue.
D. Enforcement of Arms Export Restrictions
The Arms Export Control Act provides penalties for any person who
willfully violates the Munitions List laws or regulations.55 U.S. govern-
ment officials are authorized to investigate possible violations of these
export laws both within and outside the United States. With cause, they
can search, detain, and seize goods or technology at places within the
United States and "at those places outside the United States where the
Customs Service, pursuant to agreements or other arrangements with
other countries, is authorized to perform enforcement activities."5 6
49. Servamus, July 1983, quoted in Military Exports, supra note 25, at 7.
50. Military Exports, supra note 25, at 7.
51. Strategic Sales, supra note 46, at 7.
52. Id. at 7, 15.
53. Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, supra note 1, § 322.
54. Id.
55. Violators are subject to a fine for each violation of not more than $1,000,000 or impris-
onment of not more than ten years or both. 22 U.S.C. § 2778(c) (Supp. III 1985), as amended
by Act of Aug. 8, 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-83, § 119(a), 99 Stat. 203, 204 (1985). Administrative
sanctions can also be imposed. 22 U.S.C. § 2778(e), as amended by Pub. L. No. 99-83,
§ 119(b), incorporating 50 U.S.C. app. § 2410(c)-(e),(g) (1982), as amended by Export Admin-
istration Amendments Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-64, § 112, 99 Stat. 120, 147 (1985).
56. 22 U.S.C. § 2778(e), as amended by Pub. L. No. 99-83, incorporating 50 U.S.C. app.
§ 2411 (a) (1982), as amended by Pub. L. No. 99-64, § I1 3(a)(5), 99 Stat. 120, 148 (1985).
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Despite the stiff penalties and investigatory authority, enforcement of
the arms embargo is generally lax.57 A Congressional staff study has
charged that the Space Research Corporation's extensive and long-term
violations of the embargo were made possible by OMC and U.S. Army
procedural failings, by the Central Intelligence Agency's negligence or
purposeful evasion of U.S. policy, and by "the absence of a coordinated
U.S. government enforcement system to detect and prevent such viola-
tions."5 8 Even after the violations were discovered and an investigation
had begun, no government official or agency took action to limit the ef-
fects of the violation, with the result that important arms shipments con-
tinued to reach South Africa.59 The staff study attributes these failures of
enforcement to the following:
[C]ollecting information on the embargo's operation was not high on the
list of any agency's priorities, procedures for sharing and centrally assessing
relevant information did not exist, and most fundamentally, there was no
clear delineation of organizational responsibilities for obtaining relevant in-
telligence, evaluating [it] and acting upon it.
60
It is revealing to contrast the failure of the U.S. policy of limiting arms
exports to South Africa with the success of Operation Exodus, a federal
program designed to intercept illegal technology exports to the Soviet
Union. As of January 1984, Operation Exodus had resulted in 2,330
seizures of Munitions List items and dual-use technology. 61 Apparently,
when the political will exists, the government can effectively control ille-
gal exports. A few illegal exports to South Africa have been inadver-
tently detected under Operation Exodus, 62 raising the question of how
many more go undetected because of the lack of interest among enforce-
ment officials and the absence of a program aimed specifically at South
Africa. As a Customs representative stated, South Africa "is not on the
priority list.
' '63
57. See, eg., Mehiman, Milch & Toumanoff, supra note 38, at 594 ("it is unlikely that
current enforcement efforts are successful"); Klare, supra note 31, passhln and at 22
("[M]ainstream Western sources ranging from the British Broadcasting Corporation to the
Washington Post have confirmed that millions of dollars worth of U.S. arms have reached
South African forces via illegal channels.... [I]t is reasonable to assume that there has been a
systematic breakdown in Washington's export control operations.").
58. Hearing, supra note 33, at 54-78.
59. Id. at 78-85.
60. Id. at 80 (emphasis omitted).
61. Military Exports, supra note 25, at 9.
62. Id. ("In their zeal, Customs officials have also netted a few illegal shipments to South
Africa but these are apparently regarded as an embarrassing, unintentional byproduct.") (cit-
ing U.S. Customs Service background material on Operation Exodus).
63. Quoted in id. The authors further point out that the Customs Department public af-
fairs staff is not allowed to discuss illegal exports to South Africa. in contrast to the heavy
publicity afforded seizures of equipment bound for Eastern Europe. Id. at 9-10.
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III. Exports Under Commerce Department Control
A. Commerce Department Export Regulation
In the Export Administration Act of 1979,64 Congress authorized the
President to prohibit or curtail U.S. exports "to the extent necessary to
further significantly the foreign policy of the United States or to fulfill its
declared international obligations. 65 This authority was to be adminis-
tered via export licenses issued by the Commerce Secretary.
66
The Export Administration Regulations (EAR) implement the Com-
merce Department restrictions. 67 They provide that, in general, no ex-
port68 of any commodity or technical data is permitted unless an
authorizing general license has been established or a validated license or
other authorization has been granted by the Office of Export Administra-
tion (OEA).
69
Goods and technology subject to Commerce Department EAR licens-
ing are listed on the "control list" (formerly the "commodity control
list").70 Because one category of the list consists of "[o]ther commodities
[not elsewhere specified], and parts and accessories, n.e.s., '71 all exports
of any kind are covered by the Commerce regulations, except those spe-
cifically excluded, such as items on the Munitions List.
72
B. Restrictions on Exports to South Africa
The EAR prohibit exports or reexports to South Africa and Namibia
of "arms, munitions, military equipment and materials, and materials
and machinery for use in the manufacture and maintenance of such
64. The Act was reauthorized and amended by the Export Administration Amendments
Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-64, 99 Stat. 120 (1985).
65. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(a)(1) (1982).
66. Id.
67. They appear as 15 C.F.R. pts. 368-99 (1986).
68. Exceptions are exports which are exclusively controlled by other departments, such as
items on the Munitions List and commodities subject to the Atomic Energy Act. 15 C.F.R.
§ 370.10 (1986).
69. 15 C.F.R. § 370.3(a) (1986). The regulations also subject export and reexport authori-
zations to revision, suspension or revocation by the OEA without notice. Id. § 370.3(b).
No application is required for use of a general license, and no document is issued, id.
§ 371.1; however, either a written or an oral report describing the commodity or commodities
to be exported must be provided to the customs office. Id. § 371.2(a). The primary general
license, designated G-DEST, can be used to export any item under Commerce Department
export regulation for which the regulations do not require a validated license. Id. § 371.3. A
validated license issued by, or under the authority of, the OEA authorizes a specific export. Id.
§ 372.2(a).
70. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2403(b) (1982), as amended by the Export Administration Amend-
ments Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-64, § 104(b)(1), 99 Stat. 120, 122 (1985).
71. 15 C.F.R. § 399.1, Supp. 1 (1986).
72. Id. § 370.10.
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equipment." They also prohibit the export of technical data relating to
these commodities. 73 The list of items to which this embargo applies74 is
a sublist of the control list, so that all of the items on it are subject to
exclusive Commerce Department control; there is no overlap with the
Munitions List.
Other items on the control list-with the exception of computers, nu-
clear technology, crime control and detection devices, and aircraft and
helicopters 75-are exportable or reexportable to South Africa or Namibia
on a general license, provided that the exported commodities or technical
data do not reach military or police entities in South Africa or
Namibia. 76 In other words, there is an embargo on the export or reex-
port to South Africa and Namibia of any commodity or technical data
"where the exporter or reexporter knows or has reason to know that the
commodity will be sold to or used by or for military or police entities in
these destinations or used to service equipment owned, controlled or used
by or for such military or police entities."' 77 Exporters and purchasers
cannot claim ignorance of the existence of the military/police embargo
because all exports to South Africa or Namibia require a destination con-
trol statement on the shipping documents stating that any diversion of
the exported commodity or data contrary to U.S. law, or to or for use by
or for military or police entities, is prohibited.78 Medical supplies and
anti-hijacking commodities and their correlative data are exempted from
the military/police embargo. Applications for validated licenses to ex-
port these items are generally to be "considered favorably on a case-by-
case basis."
'79
Probably the most serious loophole in the military/police embargo is
that once items exportable to other end users reach South Africa, it is
73. Export Controls on the Republic of South Africa, 50 Fed. Reg. 47,363, 47,365 (1985)
(to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 385.4(a)(1), (3)).
74. 15 C.F.R. § 379, Supp. 2 (1986).
75. See infra text accompanying notes 84-107, 116-22 & 131-37.
76. Export Controls on the Republic of South Africa, 50 Fed. Reg. 47,363, 47,364 (1985)
(to be codified at 15 C.F.R. §§ 371.2(c)(11), 379.4(e)). Military and police entities to which
the embargo applies are listed in the EAR. 15 C.F.R. § 385, Supp. 2 (1986) and 50 Fed. Reg.
47,363, 47,366 (1985).
77. Export Controls on the Republic of South Africa, 50 Fed. Reg. 47,363, 47,365 (1985)
(to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 385.4(a)(2)). The total embargo on exports to military or police
is a return to Carter Administration policy; it was mandated by Congress in 1985. Export
Administration Amendments Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-64, § 108(n), 99 Stat. 120, 136
(1985). Under authority granted to him by the Act, President Reagan has ordered the Com-
merce Department to extend the military/police embargo until July 12, 1987. 51 Fed. Reg.
26,920 (1986).
78. 15 C.F.R. § 386.6(a)(2) (1986).
79. Export Controls on the Republic of South Africa, 50 Fed. Reg. 47,363, 47,365 (1985)
(to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 385.4(a)(7), (10)).
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extremely difficult for the United States to ensure that the items do not
reach the South African military or police.80
A related loophole lies in the provision that exporters bear no responsi-
bility for end-use violations of which they do not know or have reason to
know. Thus, "as long as the South African purchaser does not give the
U.S. exporter reason to believe that the specific item being provided will
be passed on to the South African military or police, there is no penalty
to the exporter in the event of such a subsequent transfer."8'
A third problem is the exception for anti-hijacking equipment, much
of which "is virtually indistinguishable from other police gear," accord-
ing to the NARMIC project of the American Friends Service Commit-
tee.82 This equipment, NARMIC points out, "could just as easily be




In response to Congressional and public pressure, 84 President Reagan
in September 1985 issued Executive Order 12,532,85 banning all exports
of computers, computer software, and goods and technology intended to
service computers to, or for use by, the following entities of the South
African government: the military, the police, the prison system, the na-
tional security agencies, ARMSCOR and its subsidiaries, the weapons
research activities of the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research,
the administering authorities for the black passbook and similar controls,
any apartheid-enforcing agency, and any local or regional government or
"homeland" entity which performs any function of any of the entities
just described. 86 The Commerce Secretary was authorized both to issue
implementing rules and to create "a system of end use verification" to
80. See infra text accompanying notes 91-92 & 101-07.
81. Mehiman, Milch & Toumanoff, supra note 38, at 593 (footnote omitted).
82. American Friends Service Committee/NARMIC, The Reagan South African "Com-
puter Ban": An Analysis of Draft Export Regulations from the Commerce Department 5
(Nov. 11, 1985) [hereinafter Analysis of Draft Export Regulations].
83. Id. (emphasis omitted).
84. Id. at 1.
85. 50 Fed. Reg. 36,861 (1985).
86. 50 Fed. Reg. 36,861, 36,861-62 (1985). The executive order also banned most nuclear
exports to South Africa and halted imports of arms, ammunition, and military vehicles pro-
duced in South Africa. Id. at 36,862. Other provisions of the order prohibited American
financial institutions from making loans to the South African government or to entities owned
or controlled by that government and stopped the importation of South African kruggerands,
Id. at 36,861, 36,863.
Executive Order 12,532 was extended by President Reagan for one year on September 4,
1986. N.Y. Times, Sept. 5, 1986, at A5, col. 1. Moreover, a provision of the sanctions legisla-
tion adopted by Congress in October 1986 made permanent the measures contained in Execu-
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ensure that no computers exported to South Africa ended up in the ser-
vice of any of the indicated government entities.8 7 Accordingly, the
Commerce Department regulations require a validated license for the ex-
port or reexport to government consignees of computers and computer
goods and technical data; applications are to be denied if the export "is
likely to be used by or for" prohibited government entities, with case-by-
case exceptions possible for "humanitarian purposes."1
88
A problem with the list of restricted government entities is that certain
agencies are specifically excluded, including the Ministry of Communica-
tion and Public Works,89 which is responsible for building prisons and
overseeing South Africa's telecommunications system.9 O Moreover, any
of the approved agencies "could easily front" for one of the embargoed
branches of the South African government in order to obtain for the lat-
ter prohibited computer exports. 91 In general, end-use restrictions on ex-
ports to the South African government are simply unenforceable:
"[i]ntragovernmental transfers can obviously shift goods to the military
or police without the consent or knowledge of the exporter."
92
The damage that could result if the embargo were to be breached in
this manner is illustrated by an event which occurred in November 1983.
The U.S. Customs Service intercepted a computer being rerouted to the
Soviet Union that had been shipped-with the approval of the U.S.
government-to a private company in South Africa. Secretary of De-
fense Caspar Weinberger acknowledged that the computer was "'identi-
cal to a number of highly classified American systems' that could be used
to produce 'faster, more accurate and more destructive weapons.' ,93
Despite Executive Order 12,532 and the new, more stringent Commerce
Department regulations, the same computer would still be approved to-
tive Order 12,532. Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Exports Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-440,
§ 304, 100 Stat. 1086, 1099-1100.
87. 50 Fed. Reg. 36,861, 36,862 (1985). The sanctions law enacted in 1986 permits exports
of computer items to end-users other than the proscribed government entities only if an end-
use verification system is in effect. Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Exports Act of 1986, Pub.
L. No. 99-440, § 304, 100 Stat. 1086, 1099-1100.
88. Export Controls on the Republic of South Africa, 50 Fed. Reg. 47,363, 47,365,(1985)
(to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 385.4(a)(3), (9)).
89. Id. at 47,366.
90. See Analysis of Draft Export Regulations, supra note 82, at 3.
91. Id. Another possible problem with computer exports is that South African corpora-
tions that manufacture weapons and weapons components and that supply ARMSCOR are
not specifically covered by the regulations. Id. at 4. However, the Commerce Department
could deny applications for export to these end-users on the ground that the exported items are
"likely to be used" for ARMSCOR.
92. Mehlman, Milch & Toumanoff, supra note 38, at 593.
93., The Sun (N.Y. Times News Serv.), Nov. 21, 1983; MacNeil/Lehrer News Hour (PBS
television broadcast, Dec. 1983), quoted in Military Exports, supra note 25, at 1.
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day for export to private companies or to non-embargoed agencies in
South Africa unless the Department found that the computer was "likely
to be used" by or for an embargoed government entity.
Yet another loophole in the regulations is that "insubstantial"-gener-
ally, content that is 20% or less by value-U.S.-origin parts or peripher-
als in foreign-origin computer systems are to be approved on a case-by-
case basis.94 With computers, "the most critical and sensitive elements
frequently make up less than 20 per cent of the final product. '95
Applications to export computers, goods and technical data to service
computers, and software to any end-user in South Africa or Namibia
must be accompanied by a signed assurance from the ultimate consignee
that the export will not be diverted to a prohibited agency. 96 A loophole
in the EAR is that each license application that involves contracts en-
tered into prior to Executive Order 12,532 is to be considered on a case-
by-case basis in accordance with the regulations and policies that were
then in effect.
97
The summary that precedes the new regulations contains an announce-
ment that the Office of Export Administration will "institute and vigor-
ously administer an enhanced system of end use verification, which will
involve periodic verification by U.S. Government or exporter personnel
of location and use of certain computers. '98 It remains to be seen how
vigorous-and how successful-this verification system will be.
D. Aircraft
Category VIII of the Munitions List covers those aircraft "which are
specifically designed, modified, or equipped for military purposes." 99
94. Export Controls on the Republic of South Africa, 50 Fed. Reg. 47,363, 47,365 (1985)
(to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 385.4(a)(9)).
95. G. McDougall, Recent Changes in the United States Arms Embargo against South
Africa 4 (June 14, 1982) (statement before the United Nations Special Committee against
Apartheid) (copy on file with the Yale Journal of International Law).
96. Export Controls on the Republic of South Africa, 50 Fed. Reg. 47,363, 47,364-65
(1985) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. §§ 379.4(e)(2), 385.4(a)(9)(iii)).
97. Id. at 47,365-66 (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 385.4(a)(12)). This regulation is a result
of Congress's determination that the President may not interfere with exports or reexports
mandated by existing contracts unless he certifies that "a serious and direct threat to the strate-
gic interests of the United States" can be answered only by overriding existing contracts with
the new export policy. Export Administration Amendments Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-64,
§ 108, 99 Stat. 120, 136 (1985).
98. Export Controls on the Republic of South Africa, 50 Fed. Reg. 47,363 (1985).
99. 22 C.F.R. § 121.1 (1986). This category is subject to a proviso included in the Export
Administration Act which explicitly bars from Munitions List controls, and subjects exclu-
sively to Commerce Department controls, "any product (1) which is standard equipment...
in civil aircraft and is an integral part of such aircraft, and (2) which is to be exported to a
country other than a controlled country." 50 U.S.C. app. § 2416(c) (1982). The "controlled"
countries are generally those of the Soviet bloc. 22 U.S.C. § 2370(f) (1982).
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Such aircraft are thus subject to the ITAR. The Commerce regulations
require a validated license for export to all consignees of non-Munitions
List aircraft and helicopters; applications for such exports are generally
to be considered favorably on a case-by-case basis if "adequate written
assurances" against military, paramilitary, or police use are provided.' °
There is a weakness here that pervades the regulations: it is virtually
impossible to control how an export is used once it reaches South Africa.
According to one report, "Pretoria's military is already using civilian
versions of the Cessna U-17 Skywagon [supplied by United States com-
panies] ... in counterguerrilla operations."10' Another authority states
that Lockheed C-130's and L-10's, sold by the U.S. as "civilian" planes,
are used to move South African Army troops, equipment, and sup-
plies. 10 2 In addition, it has been reported that two U.S.-made Helio Cou-
rier airplanes were provided in March 1982 to a puppet army in the
homeland Bophuthatswana by a South African civilian source, and that
security forces in Ciskei use U.S. aircraft.
10 3
Another problem is that, because of South Africa's extensive civilian
defense forces and reserves, even civilian aircraft are at the service of the
military. Citizens in the various branches of these forces are subject to
mobilization at the call of the South African President "in Time of War
or in Connection with the Combating of Terrorism or in Connection
with an Armed Conflict outside the Republic or in Connection with In-
ternal Disorder or Other Emergency."' 4 Aircraft in the hands of these
citizens can be of immense use to the South African Air Force. The Air
Commandos, for example, "consist of at least 12 volunteer squadrons of
civilian owner-pilots who are trained to provide light support. Most of
the aircraft flown in these units are believed to be of American origin."
10 5
Finally, the South African government retains broad powers that al-
low it, "in defence of the Republic or for the prevention or suppression of
100. Export Controls on the Republic of South Africa, 50 Fed. Reg. 47,363, 47,365 (1985)
(to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 385.4(a)(8)).
101. Conrad, U.S. Data Processing Corporations Are Supplying South Africa with the Brains
of its Military and Police Services, MULTINATIONAL MONITOR, April 1982, at 14.
102. International Defence & Aid Fund, Fact Paper on South Africa No. 8, The
Apartheid War Machine: The Strength and Deployment of the South African Armed Forces
(April 1980), reprinted in G. Butcher, Prepared Statement, Testimony before the House For-
eign Affairs Subcommittees on Africa and International Economic Policy and Trade, app. C at
9-10 (Feb. 9, 1982) (copy on file with the Yale Journal of International Law); see also Klare,
supra note 31, at 20-21.
103. Analysis of Draft Export Regulations, supra note 82, at 6; see also Military Exports,
supra note 25, at 5.
104. Statutes of the Republic of South Africa, Defence Act No. 44 of 1957, ch. X, re-
printed in G. Butcher, supra note 102, app. C at 5 (italics omitted).
105. International Defence & Aid Fund, supra note 102, reprinted in G. Butcher, supra
note 102, app. C at 10.
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terrorism or for the prevention or suppression of internal disorder in the
Republic," to assume control over, or requisition use of, any civilian
transport system or air service.' 0 6 More generally, South African law
permits the government to "expropriate privately owned goods and serv-
ices at any time it deems necessary for the security of the state."'
10 7
E. Dual-Use Equipment
Commerce regulations take a permissive stance towards the export to
civilians, and to government agencies other than the military or police, of
dual-use equipment-i.e., goods with both military and civilian applica-
tion. Apart from computers and aircraft, these goods are principally
electronics equipment.108 Dual-use electronics equipment and related
technical data are easily exportable; they are subject only to the same
restriction that applies, for example, to the export of toothpaste: the ex-
porter must not know or have reason to know that the commodity or
technical data will come into the possession of the military or police.'0 9
As with computers and aircraft,110 it is very difficult to enforce the mili-
tary/police embargo once dual-use items have been exported to civilians
or government agencies in South Africa.
F. Components and Spare Parts
The export of components and spare parts of items listed on the Muni-
tions List is restricted by the ITAR."'1 The EAR provide that non-
Munitions List components and parts exported from the United States
and used to manufacture or produce a foreign-made end product are sub-
ject to U.S. export control laws." 2 Generally, that end product cannot
be sent to a new destination without prior written OEA approval when-
ever either the U.S.-origin part or component or the end product could
106. Statutes of the Republic of South Africa, Defence Act No. 44 of 1957, § 102, re-
printed in G. Butcher, supra note 102, app. F at 12; see also discussion of the unenforceability
of end-use restrictions, supra text accompanying notes 91-92.
107. Mehlman, Milch & Toumanoff, supra note 38, at 593.
108. See supra text accompanying notes 28-31 for discussion of the importance to South
Africa of electronics imports. See also Controls on Exports to South Africa: Hearings before the
Subcomms. on International Economic Policy and Trade and on Africa of the House Comm. on
Foreign Affairs, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 64 (1982) (testimony of Thomas Conrad, American
Friends Service Committee/NARMIC) ("In the long run, exports of [high-tech equipment]
are probably more significant and pernicious than trafficking in actual arms, because they con-
tribute to South Africa's entire infrastructure of repression.").
109. Export Controls on the Republic of South Africa, 50 Fed. Reg. 47,363, 47,365 (1985)
(to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 385.4(a)(2), (3)(ii)).
110. See supra text accompanying notes 91-92 & 101-07.
111. See 22 C.F.R. § 121.1 (1986).
112. 15 C.F.R. § 376.12 (1986).
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not have been exported directly from the United States under a general
license.' 13 Also, parts and components exported from the United States
cannot be used in foreign-made end products "where it is known or there
is reason to know" that the end product will be sold to or used by mili-
tary or police entities in South Africa or Namibia.'
4
Export restrictions on components and spare parts are particularly dif-
ficult to enforce. One report charges that "[r]ather than outright sales of
large weapons systems, exports by U.S. corporations consist to a great
extent of the building blocks of modem weaponry-components, unfin-
ished subassemblies and other technology that can easily be submerged
in large wholesale transactions."
' 15
G. Crime Control and Detection Commodities
Congress requires a validated export license approved by the Secretar-
ies of Commerce and State for the export of crime control and detection
instruments and equipment.16 Commerce's regulations provide that
such applications
generally will be considered favorably on a case-by-case basis unless there is
evidence that the government of the importing country may have violated
internationally recognized human rights and that the judicious use of ex-
port controls would be helpful in deterring the development of a consistent
pattern of such violations or in distancing the United States from such
violations. 117
In relation to South Africa and Namibia, the regulations state only that a
validated license is required for the export of crime control and detection
commodities." 8 The Commerce Department thus can permit sales of
these commodities to South Africa's growing private police industry.' 19
One such sale occurred in 1982 when through an "administrative error"
the Commerce Department licensed the sale of 2500 U.S.-made shock
batons to a South African holding company. 120 The exporters claimed
that the South African company was planning to resell the devices to
private security firms. 121 In a letter to then-Commerce Secretary Mal-
113. See id.
114. Export Controls on the Republic of South Africa, 50 Fed. Reg. 47,363, 47,365 (1985)
(to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 385.4(a)(4)).
115. Military Exports, supra note 25, at 2.
116. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405G) (1982), as amended by Pub. L. No. 99-64, § 108(k), 99 Stat.
120, 135-36 (1985).
117. 15 C.FR. § 376.14 (1986).
118. Export Controls on the Republic of South Africa, 50 Fed. Reg. 47,363, 47,365 (1985)
(to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 385.4(a)(5)).
119. Analysis of Draft Export Regulations, supra note 82, at 5.
120. Congress to Probe Shock Baton Sale, AFR. NEWS, Oct. 18, 1982, at 5-7.
121. Id. at 6.
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colm Baldridge, six members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
asserted that the licensing error "calls into questions [sic] the efficiency of
current processing arrangements for export license applications."'' 22
H. Foreign Subsidiaries of U.S. Corporations
Both State and Commerce Department regulations deal exclusively
with U.S.-origin exports and reexports. Commodities manufactured by
foreign subsidiaries (whether in South Africa or in other countries) of
U.S. companies, but not under a U.S. license or containing components
or technology of U.S. origin, are not subject to the controls of either
department.123 However, the Administration has the power to place
trade restrictions on foreign subsidiaries of U.S. corporations. The Ex-
port Administration Act authorizes the President to control any export
"by any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States,"' 124 a
phrase that can include foreign subsidiaries of U.S. c6rporations.1 25
Moreover, the Act applies to any "United States person," which is de-
fined to include "any foreign subsidiary or affiliate (including any perma-
nent foreign establishment) of any domestic concern which is controlled
in fact by such domestic concern, as determined under regulations of the
President."'126 Thus, implementation of arms trade restrictions on sub-
sidiaries depends upon an explicit action of the Executive.
I. Enforcement of Commerce Department Export Restrictions
The Export Administration Act provides stiff penalties for violation of
its provisions. 27 U.S. government officials are authorized to investigate,
122. Id. at 7.
123. "Subsidiaries of American firms located in South Africa and other countries may
provide the most substantial amount of U.S. support for the policy of apartheid." Mehlman,
Milch & Toumanoff, supra note 38, at 600. The authors refer to this issue as the "potentially
most important failure of existing export restrictions." Id. at 596.
124. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(a)(1) (1982).
125. See War or National Emergency-Presidential Powers, Pub. L. No. 95-223, Title I,
91 Stat. 1625 (1977); H.R. REP. No. 459, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 17 (1977) (indicating that
Congress used the quoted phrase in the Export Administration Act as amended in order to
"provide authority for control over exports of non-U.S.-origin goods and technology by for-
eign subsidiaries of U.S. concerns"); see also M. Mehlman & T. Milch, United States Restric-
tions on Exports to South Africa-A Reevaluation 50-55 (Apr. 3, 1979) (unpublished
memorandum on file with the Yale Journal of International Law).
126. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2415 (1982); see also Mehlman, Milch & Toumanoff, supra note 38,
at 597 (arguing that the U.N. Participation Act of 1945, as amended, 22 U.S.C. § 287c(a)
(1982), which confers on the President broad authority to implement Security Council man-
dates, affords another statutory basis for the executive branch to impose trade restrictions on
foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies).
127. The Act provides that anyone who knowingly violates, or conspires or attempts to
violate, any provision of the Act or any regulation, order, or license issued under it is punish-
able for each violation by a fine of not more than five times the value of the exports involved or
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both within and outside the United States, possible violations of the
EAR, and, with cause, to search, detain, and seize goods or technology at
places within this country and "at those places outside the United States
where the Customs Service, pursuant to agreements or other arrange-
ments with other countries, is authorized to perform enforcement
activities."1 28
As with defense exports, enforcement of Commerce Department ex-
port restrictions is not sufficiently vigilant. The Congressional Research
Service affirmed in November 1985 that "clandestine arms deliveries re-
portedly continue. The primary vehicle is the production of U.S.-
designed aircraft, aircraft engines, weapons, and computer systems by
corporations based in third countries." 129 A Commerce Department offi-
cial stated in 1977 Congressional testimony that the government relies on
the U.S. Embassy in South Africa to monitor compliance with the em-
bargo, but that "enforcement is a difficult matter in this area." 130 It re-
mains to be seen whether the new, more stringent export regulations
prompted by Executive Order 12,532 will be matched by more effective
enforcement.
IV. Exports of Nuclear Equipment and Materials
A. Nuclear Export Controls
Congress has directed the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to
prepare a list of components, items, and substances that "are especially
relevant from the standpoint of export control because of their signifi-
$50,000, whichever is greater, or by imprisonment for not more than five years, or both. Any-
one who willfully violates, or conspires or attempts to violate, any provision of the Act or any
regulation, order, or license issued under it, with knowledge that the exports involved will be
used for the benefit of any controlled country or any country to which exports are restricted
for national security or foreign policy purposes, is subject to a fine of not more than five times
the value of the exports involved or $1,000,000, whichever is greater. In the case of an individ-
ual, the penalty is a fine of not more than $250,000 or imprisonment for not more than ten
years or both. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2410 (1982), as amended by Pub. L. No. 99-64, § 112, 99 Stat.
120, 146 (1985). The Commerce Department can also impose administrative penalties, includ-
ing fines and denials of export privileges. Id.; 15 C.F.R. § 387.1(b) (1986).
128. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2411(a) (1982), as amended by Pub. L. No. 99-64, 99 Stat. 120, 148-
49 (1985).
129. B. BRANAMAN, supra note 32, at 8; see also Mehlman, Milch & Toumanoff, supra
note 38, at 593-96, 600-01 (noting that "unlawful diversions of U.S. commodities and technol-
ogy through third countries and end-use diversions after exports reach South Africa appear to
constitute a major means by which the current embargo may be circumvented").
130. United States-South Africa Relations: Arms Embargo Implementation: Hearings
before the Subcomm. on Africa of the House Comm. on International Relations, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 58-59 (1977) (testimony of Stanley J. Marcuss, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Commerce
for Domestic Commerce); see also supra text accompanying notes 91-92 & 101-07 for discus-
sion of the unenforceability of end-use restrictions once exports reach South Africa.
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cance for nuclear explosive purposes" and to regulate exports of these
commodities through licensing.' 3' The President is directed to publish
procedures regarding Commerce Department controls over all other ex-
port items which could, if used for purposes other than those for which
the export is intended, be of significance for nuclear explosive
purposes. 13
2
The NRC regulations list nuclear equipment and material subject to
export and import licensing. 133 South Africa is a "restricted destina-
tion,"'134 meaning that some regulated commodities can be shipped to it
on a general license while others require a specific license. Review of
license applications is designed to ensure that exports will not be used for
nuclear explosive devices, that International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) safeguards will be applied, that adequate physical security meas-
ures will be maintained, and that a proposed export "is not inimical to
the common defense and security" as determined by the State
Department. 135
The Commerce Department has compiled the Nuclear Referral List, a
sublist of the control list consisting of those commodities that are of po-
tential significance for nuclear explosive purposes. Validated licenses and
special procedures are required for the export of these items. 3 6 Further-
more, the regulations require a validated license for the export of any
commodity that the exporter knows or has reason to know will be used
for a nuclear weapons purpose. 137 In addition, nuclear weapons design
and test equipment constitute category XVI of the Munitions List 3 8 and
thus are subject to the Department of State regulations.
B. Controls on Nuclear Exports to South Africa
The Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 includes provisions
dealing specifically with nuclear exports to South Africa. 39 Exports of
production or utilization facilities, source or special nuclear material,
sensitive nuclear technology, and nuclear materials potentially useful for
131. 42 U.S.C. § 2139 (1982).
132. Id.
133. 10 C.F.R. § 110.8-.9 (1986).'
134. Id. § 110.29.
135. Id. § 110.42. The President must terminate nuclear exports to a non-nuclear weapon
state (defined as a state which had not exploded a nuclear device as of Jan. 1, 1967) under
certain circumstances, such as if he finds that it has detonated a nuclear explosive device after
March 10, 1978. Id. §§ 110.2, 110.45.
136. 15 C.F.R. §§ 378.2(a), § 378 Supp. 1 (1986).
137. Id. § 399.1(f)(4)(i).
138. 22 C.F.R. § 121.1 (1986).
139. Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986. Pub. L. No. 99-440. 100 Stat. 1086
(1986).
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explosive purposes are prohibited unless the U.S. government determines
that South Africa has become a party to the Treaty on the Non-Prolifera-
tion of Nuclear Weapons or otherwise maintains IAEA safeguards.14
0
The President can waive the export prohibitions if he determines that
invoking them would seriously hinder U.S. non-proliferation objectives
or jeopardize U.S. defense and security, and if he reports this to Con-
gress.' 4 ' In addition to these statutory provisions, current Commerce
regulations require exporters of computers to South Africa or Namibia to
certify that the goods will not be sold to or used by entities involved in
nuclear activities.1 42
V. Recommendations
This article has demonstrated that the piecemeal approach of the exec-
utive branch toward implementing the arms embargo against South Af-
rica contains serious omissions and loopholes. This section discusses a
number of steps that could be taken by the government to strengthen its
embargo policy. A total trade embargo would be the most effective step.
It would eliminate U.S. support for the South African economy, unequiv-
ocally voice American condemnation of apartheid, and be easier to en-
force than the present system (because there would be no exceptions or
exercises of discretion). A total trade embargo would require Congres-
sional action. Although the House of Representatives recently passed
such an expansive measure, 143 House leaders subsequently accepted in its
stead Senate legislation imposing more limited sanctions.
144
Even if a total trade embargo is not imposed, the United States should
increase the effectiveness of the current arms embargo. First, the em-
bargo should be broadened so that no Munitions List items or anti-hi-
jacking commodities are exported to South Africa, dual-use items are
more closely restricted, foreign subsidiaries of U.S. corporations are reg-
ulated, and training of South African military and police is ceased. Sec-
ond, enforcement of the embargo should be improved, both in the United
States and abroad. Finally, the cooperation of our allies should be
140. Id. § 307(a). The Act contains an exception to the export prohibitions for assistance
designed to help South Africa reduce proliferation risks. Id. § 307(b).
141. Id. § 307(c).
142. Export Controls on the Republic of South Africa, 50 Fed. Reg. 47,363, 47,365 (1985)
(to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 385.4(a)(9)(iii)).
143. The text of the bill, proposed as an amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.R.
4868 by Rep. Dellums, is found at H.R. 4868, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 132 CONG. Rrc. 3908-09
(1986).
144. See supra note 1; N. Y. Times, Sept. 13, 1986, at 1. col. 5. Denmark is alone among
the major Western nations in having proclaimed a total trade boycott of South Africa. N.Y.
Times, Sept. 14, 1986, § 1, at 1, col. 1.
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sought toward the goal of preventing arms and related goods from reach-
ing South Africa from any part of the world. Each of these suggestions is
addressed below.
A. Broadening the Existing Arms Embargo
1. Export of Munitions List and Anti-Hijacking Commodities
The Administration should adhere to its own stated policy and cease
licensing ostensibly "civilian" Munitions List items. 145 Commodities
such as image intensifiers are on the Munitions List because of their po-
tential for military application, 46 and should not be exported to South
Africa under any circumstances. In addition, commodities "to be used in
efforts to prevent acts of unlawful interference with international civil
aviation"'147 should not be exportable to South Africa because many anti-
hijacking commodities can also be used by police against political oppo-
nents.148 The current regulations provide for a presumption of exporta-
bility for such items, even when the acknowledged end-user is a military
or police entity.
149
2. Export of Dual-Use Equipment
Because their transfer to apartheid-enforcing entities cannot effectively
be prevented by U.S. authorities, 150 exports of dual-use items such as
computers, electronics, aircraft, and crime control equipment should be
barred to any South African end-user. Halting the sale of aircraft to
South Africa, for example, would be an extremely effective means of
strengthening the embargo, particularly in light of a 1985 report that "in
the view of many independent analysts,... [South Africa's manufactur-
ing capability] has lagged behind in such key fields as aircraft, tanks and
other armored vehicles."' 51 Alternatively, such exports should be prohib-
ited to any government or state organization so that intragovernmental
transfers would be impossible; here, though, the problem of potential
military expropriation of dual-use items from civilian users would
remain.
145. See supra text accompanying notes 23-27.
146. See supra text accompanying notes 28-31.
147. Export Controls on the Republic of South Africa, 50 Fed. Reg. 47,363, 47,365 (1985)
(to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 385.4(a)(10)).
148. See supra text accompanying notes 82-83.
149. See Export Controls on the Republic of South Africa, 50 Fed. Reg. 47,363, 47,365
(1985) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 385.4(a)(2), (3)(ii), (4), (10)).
150. See supra text accompanying notes 91-92 & 101-07.
151. Frankel, U.N. Arms Ban Proves Costly to South Africans, Wash. Post. Feb. 24, 1985,
at A26, col. I.
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Another way to restrict dual-use exports would be for the Commerce
Department to establish a presumption against licensing any export to
South Africa, rebuttable only if an exporter could show that a particular
item lacked military or police utility. 152 Alternatively, Commerce could
publish both its internal licensing standards and non-confidential infor-
mation about pending license applications; before license applications are
approved, public comment could be solicited, at least in contexts not in-
volving national security considerations. Such a system would remove
the shroud of secrecy currently surrounding export license applications
and would permit exports inconsistent with the spirit of the embargo to
be publicly challenged.
1 53
Even if these broad solutions to the dual-use problem are rejected,
other narrower improvements should be adopted. For example, export
of dual-use electronics commodities should at least be barred to the same
"apartheid-enforcing entities" to which computer sales are prohibited.1 54
Also, "insubstantial" U.S.-origin parts or peripherals in foreign-origin
computer systems should be denied export licenses in order to prevent
critical U.S.-made components from reaching South Africa.
1 55
3. Foreign Subsidiaries of U.S. Corporations
According to a recent report, "[m]ultinational corporations have
globalized their production to such an extent that it is easy to manipulate
supply sources to avoid the scrutiny and control of any one national gov-
ernment."1 56 Presently, U.S. multinationals can legally evade the em-
bargo export restrictions by producing abroad items for export to South
Africa that could not legally be exported from the United States. There-
fore, all restrictions that apply to exports of U.S.-origin commodities and
technical data should also apply to exports by foreign subsidiaries of U.S.
corporations outside of South Africa and to sales by subsidiaries located
in South Africa.157
152. See Mehlman, Milch & Toumanoff, supra note 38, at 598.
153. Id. at 598-600.
154. See supra text accompanying notes 25-31 & 108-10.
155. See supra text accompanying notes 94-95.
156. NARMIC/AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE, AUTOMATING
APARTHEID-U.S. COMPUTER EXPORTS TO SOUTH AFRICA AND THE ARMS EMBARGO 63
(1982).
157. See supra notes 124-26 and accompanying text (arguing that the Export Administra-
tion Act as amended authorizes the President to exercise regulatory authority over exports by
foreign subsidiaries of U.S. corporations); see also Mehlman, Milch & Toumanoff, supra note
38, at 600 & n.86 (citing Fontaine v. SEC, 259 F. Supp. 880 (D.P.R. 1966) to support the
proposition that foreign subsidiaries which violate U.S. export restrictions "could arguably be
barred from further U.S. business transactions").
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4. Contacts with South African Military and Police
The South African military and police should be ostracized from the
world community. To this end, NATO intelligence should not be shared
with South Africa, training of South Africans by federal drug enforce-
ment and Coast Guard personnel should cease, and interpolice contacts
at all levels should be discouraged.
1 58
B. Improving Enforcement of the Embargo
The arms embargo against South Africa must become a priority of the
U.S. government. If the Administration monitored embargo compliance
with the same vigor and vigilance with which its Operation Exodus has
policed export restrictions applicable to the Soviet Union, 59 no doubt
more violations would be uncovered and still others deterred.
An effective way to improve enforcement of the arms embargo would
be to replace the current ad hoc enforcement situation with an organized
system supervised by one lead office.1 60 This office would have the spe-
cific responsibility of enforcing the arms embargo and would coordinate
the activity of relevant government officials so that errors such as those
which were made in the Space Research case 161 would not be repeated.
Regardless of who is responsible for policing the embargo, whether a new
office or existing institutions, there should be increased intelligence gath-
ering on illegal arms exports, better intragovernmental communications
procedures, and more trained staff to monitor embargo compliance. 62 If
the exportation of dual-use equipment to civilian and some government
end-users continues, end-use monitoring must be vastly improved. The
Customs Department and U.S. embassies in key countries should be pro-
vided with increased resources, personnel, and training, in order more
effectively to halt smuggling and monitor end-use compliance.
Another way to improve enforcement of the embargo is to impose af-
firmative reporting requirements on U.S. companies exporting to South
Africa. These companies would be required to monitor the end-use of
their exports once the items reach South Africa and would face U.S.-
imposed sanctions for end-use violations. 63
158. See supra text accompanying notes 43-54.
159. See supra text accompanying notes 61-63.
160. See Hearing, supra note 33, at 45.
161. See supra text accompanying notes 33-34 & 57-60.
162. See Hearing, supra note 33, at 46.
163. See Mehiman, Milch & Toumanoff, supra note 38, at 601.
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C. International Cooperation
The United States must convince its allies that the arms embargo
should be vigorously implemented and enforced. South Africa will be
neither morally ostracized nor militarily hampered if other governments
allow it to receive arms and related material in violation of the United
Nations embargo.
The current international climate seems conducive to achieving the
goal of isolating South Africa through an effective arms embargo. The
European Community and several members of the Commonwealth of
Nations adopted sanctions against South Africa in 1986.164 In the
United States, the Reagan Administration has been harshly criticized for
not abandoning its policy of constructive engagement. 165 A display of
initiative by the United States in coordinating an international effort to
establish an effective arms embargo would signal our commitment to jus-
tice and enhance the opportunity for peaceful change in South Africa.
164. The European Community banned imports of iron, steel, and gold coins from South
Africa and prohibited new investment there. N.Y. Times, Sept. 21, 1986, § 4, at 1, col. 4. The
likely effect of the European sanctions, however, was "severely limited" by West Germany's
block of a ban on coal imports. IaL Japan has joined the Community in prohibiting imports of
iron and steel from South Africa. Id
Six leaders of the Commonweath of Nations have agreed to adopt certain measures "and
commend them to the rest of the Commonwealth and the wider international community for
urgent adoption and implementation." Excerpts From the London Communique, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 6, 1986, at A10, col. 2. Major features of the sanctions include: a ban on the import of
iron, steel, uranium, coal, and agricultural products from South Africa; a ban on new invest-
ment in, promotion of tourism to, and air links with South Africa; the termination of all gov-
ernment assistance to, investment in, and trade with South Africa, and the withdrawal of most
consular facilities there; and a ban on all new bank loans to South Africa. Id. The British
government did not subscribe to these measures, agreeing only to voluntary bans on new in-
vestment in, and the promotion of tourism to, South Africa, and to the European Community
sanctions described above. Id.
165. Congress's official response was the sanctions bill enacted in October 1986. See supra
note I.
